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economies of many developing countries. The elimination of import tariffs has the potential to
benefit producers in the developing countries, but estimates of the extent of the gains from trade
liberalization typically assume perfect competition. Significant concentration in the food
processing and retailing sectors of the U.S. and the EU undermine the plausibility of this
assumption in the case of agricultural trade, however. Sexton, Sheldon, McCorriston, and Wang
(2007) develop a model of the effects of trade liberalization that accounts for the vertically-linked
and concentrated characteristics of the developed countries’ food markets. Their analysis is limited
to the case of a constant per unit tariff, however. In this paper, we extend the analysis of the effects
of trade liberalization in the presence of downstream market power to the case of an ad valorem
tariff, and we find important qualitative differences from the results for the unit tariff case.
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1. Introduction. 
Agriculture plays a key role in developing countries’ economies.  According to 
the United Nation’s Food and Agriculture Organization, agriculture’s share in 
developing countries’ GDP is a little more than ten percent, but more than half of 
the economically active population is engaged in this sector (FAO, 2004, Table 
A4).  The majority of developing countries’ export earnings come from a few 
agricultural commodities and, therefore, trade in agriculture has more significant 
implications for the low income countries than for the rich countries.  In 
recognition of these facts, increasing the access of low-income, agricultural 
commodity exporting countries to developed countries’ markets has been one of 
the central issues in the last several rounds of World Trade Organization 
negotiations. 
Motivated by the belief that increased access to developed countries’ 
markets will boost producers’ earnings and accelerate economic growth, 
developing countries advocate the elimination of high agricultural tariffs.  
Agricultural imports from developing countries are used as raw materials for the 
food and beverage industries in the developed countries, however, and the impact 
of trade liberalization in agricultural commodity markets will depend on conduct 
in these industries.1  An increasing pace of consolidations and rising market 
concentration in developed countries’ food processing and retailing sectors raises 
the prospect of non-competitive conduct by firms in these sectors.2  Although 
most agricultural trade policy analyses in the literature rely on the competitive 
market paradigm, Sexton et al. (2007) have incorporated the vertically-linked and 
concentrated characteristics of developed countries’ food markets in their analysis 
of the impact of agricultural trade liberalization on developing countries’ 
economic development.3  The Sexton et al. (2007) model assumes price-taking 
conduct by producers in the developing country and consumers in the developed 
country, with the behavior of these agents summarized by linear farm supply and 
retail demand functions.  Food processors and retailers in the developed country 
may engage in oligopoly/oligopsony conduct.  Sexton et al. (2007) show that an 
analysis based on the assumption of competitive conduct will overstate the price 
 

For example, McMillan et al. (2003) and Wilcox and Abbott (2004) discuss examples from the 
Mozambique cashew nut sector and the Ivory Coast cocoa market, respectively, in which the gains 
from liberalization appear to have largely been captured by market-power-wielding processors and 
exporters – in these cases, in the developing countries themselves – rather than by farmers.

 Sexton et al. (2007) summarize the findings of several studies detailing the extent of 
concentration in food processing and retailing in the U.S. and the EU.

Ahn and Lee (2010) is one recent example of agricultural trade policy analysis that accounts for 
market power in the food marketing channel. 

1Hoque and Schroeter: Trade Liberalization and Market Power
Brought to you by | Iowa State University
Authenticated
Download Date | 8/23/18 5:22 PM
and quantity effects of the removal of a tariff if firms exercise market power.  
They also investigate the implications of market power for the distribution of the 
benefits of trade liberalization.  Here, their finding is that market power generally 
erodes the shares of the welfare gains reaped by producers and consumers, and 
enhances the share claimed by marketing firms. 
The Sexton et al. (2007) analysis of trade liberalization considers the case 
of the removal of a constant per unit tariff.  One of the extensions they suggest is 
the counterpart to their analysis for an ad valorem tariff.  On its face, this case 
appears to have the potential to deliver qualitatively different results because an 
ad valorem tariff does not merely shift the imported commodity supply curve that 
processors face, it rotates it, making it less elastic and thereby increasing the 
pricing distortion that results from any given degree of processor oligopsony 
power.  Conversely, when such a tariff is removed, the scope for the exercise of 
oligopsony power is correspondingly reduced, further contributing to the benefits 
of trade liberalization. 
In this paper, we present the analysis of the effects of trade liberalization 
with downstream market power for the ad valorem case.  Our main result is that, 
for certain patterns of oligopoly/oligopsony conduct in the marketing channel, and 
for parameter values that are representative of real-world agricultural commodity 
import markets, the effects of trade liberalization for the ad valorem case exhibit 
qualitative differences from those for the unit tariff case.  In particular, there are 
circumstances under which an analysis assuming competitive conduct could 
actually understate the price and quantity effects of removal of the tariff if there is 
oligopsony power exercised by processors and/or retailers.  The effects of market 
power on the distribution of gains from trade reform can also differ substantially 
from those for the unit tariff case.  It is possible that the gains to producers and 
consumers of the removal of an ad valorem tariff could actually be greater with 
oligopsony power than in a regime of competitive conduct. 
The next section provides a simple illustration of the differences in the 
effects of trade liberalization for the ad valorem and constant per unit tariff cases.  
Section 3 develops a general model that can be used to project the impact of 
removal of an ad valorem tariff for various patterns and degrees of oligopoly and 
oligopsony power in the marketing channel.  Section 4 undertakes some 
numerical calculations designed to illustrate the range of outcomes that are 
possible.  A final section offers concluding remarks. 
2. Trade liberalization with unit and ad valorem tariffs. 
Sexton et al. (2007) consider a setting in which farms in a developing country 
produce and export a primary commodity to a developed country.  The processors 
and retailers, which together comprise the downstream sector in the developed 
2 Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization Vol. 8 [2010], Article 11
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country, process the imported raw agricultural product and sell it to domestic 
consumers.  Trade in the primary commodity is subject to a tariff (either unit or 
ad valorem) imposed by the developed country.  Conversion of the farm product 
to the retail good does not allow substitution between the raw commodity and 
other inputs, so quantities at the farm, wholesale, and retail market stages can all 
be measured in retail-product-equivalent units, for example, and denoted by the 
same variable.  Both processors and retailers operate at constant marginal cost.  
Producers in the developing country and consumers in the developed country are 
price-takers, whereas processors and retailers may exercise market power in their 
input and output markets. 
To illustrate the differences in the effects of trade liberalization for unit 
and ad valorem tariffs, consider first the case in which retailers are price takers in 
their input (wholesale) and output (retail) markets, while processors may exercise 
oligopsony power in their input (farm) market and oligopoly power in their output 
(wholesale) market.  Let P  with superscripts of “ r ,” “ w ,” and “ f ,” denote price 
at the retail, wholesale, and farm levels, respectively.  Likewise, let rQ , wQ , and 
fQ  denote aggregate quantity in these respective markets; although equilibrium 
will be characterized by QQQQ fwr === , say.  While the primary focus will 
be on linear demand and supply curves,4 for now, denote (inverse) retail demand 
and farm supply functions in general functional form as ( )rrr QDP =  and 
( )fff QSP = , where ( ) 0<⋅′rD  and ( ) 0>⋅′fS . 
With price-taking behavior in the retail sector, profit-maximizing retail 
firms will purchase the wholesale product up to the point at which the wholesale 
price is equal to the retail price net of marginal retailing cost, giving rise to the 
wholesale demand function: 
( ) ( ) rrrwww cQDQDP −== ,      (1) 
where rc  denotes marginal retailing cost.  For the case of a specific tariff of T
dollars per unit, the analysis follows Sexton et al. (2007).  For the representative 
firm in the processing sector profit is 
( ) ( )( ) qcqTQSqQD pffwwp −⋅+−⋅=pi ,    (2) 
 

We retain the assumption in Sexton et al. (2007) of linear supply and demand functions although, 
as they acknowledge, the choice of functional form is not innocuous in an analysis of tax 
incidence.  Note 6 includes an additional observation about the implications of functional form.
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where q  denotes the representative firm’s quantity and pc  is marginal processing 
cost.  Differentiating: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ,TcQSQQSQDQQD
Tc
dq
dQQSqQS
dq
dQQDqQD
dq
d
pff
f
ff
f
ww
w
ww
w
p
f
f
f
f
f
w
w
w
w
w
p
−−⋅
′
⋅−−⋅
′
⋅+=
−−
′
⋅−−
′
⋅+=
φθ
pi
where conjectural elasticities ( ) ( )www QqdqdQ ⋅≡θ  and 
( ) ( )fff QqdqdQ ⋅≡φ  are the conventional indices of market power.  0=wθ  
( 0=fφ ) corresponds to price-taking behavior in the output (input) market while 
1=wθ  ( 1=fφ ) corresponds to pure monopoly (monopsony) conduct.  
Intermediate values of wθ  ( fφ ) map to hypothetical oligopoly (oligopsony) 
solution concepts between the polar cases of competitive conduct and pure 
monopoly (monopsony).  Setting the expression for dqpid p  equal to zero, using 
(1), and imposing QQQQ fwr ≡== , the result is the industry equilibrium 
condition for the case of oligopoly/oligopsony power in the processing sector: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .TccQSQQSQDQQD rpfffwrr ++=⋅′⋅−−⋅′⋅+ φθ (3) 
Our interest focuses on the discrete changes in equilibrium that are 
brought about by the removal of the tariff under various circumstances.  But 
insights into the direction and comparative magnitudes of these changes can be 
obtained by examining the derivative of the equilibrium quantity with respect to 
the size of the tariff.  Differentiation of (3) yields:5 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )QSQQSQDQQDdT
dQ
f
f
f
f
r
w
r
w ″
⋅⋅−
′
⋅+−″⋅⋅+′⋅+
=
φφθθ 11
1
. 
Confining attention to the case of linear demand and supply ( ( ) ( ) 0=⋅″=⋅″ fr SD ), 
we have: 
 

 The derivative is calculated assuming that the nature of oligopoly and oligopsony conduct, 
reflected in the values of the conduct parameters, wθ  and fφ , will be unaffected by a change in 
the tariff.
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( ) ( )
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φθ
φθ
  Naturally, reducing (or removing) a unit tariff increases equilibrium quantity
( 0<dTdQ ) in any case, but the absolute magnitude of the quantity impact is 
always smaller when processors exercise market power than when they behave 
competitively.6  Thus, with linear supply and demand curves, an analysis based on 
the assumption of competitive conduct will overstate the effects of trade 
liberalization if food processing firms actually exercise market power.  Sexton et 
al. (2007) show that this qualitative finding applies not only to the case of 
processor oligopoly/oligopsony, but also to the case of single stage market power 
in the retail sector, as well as to cases involving non-competitive conduct in 
successive stages of the marketing channel. 
The intuition of this result can be seen in Figures 1 and 2.  Figure 1 depicts 
a perfectly competitive equilibrium with a tariff at output 0Q , retail price 
( )00 QDP rr = , and farm price ( )00 QSP ff = .  From equation (3) with 
0== fw φθ , the spread between retail and farm prices in this equilibrium is 
simply the sum of marginal marketing (processing and retailing) cost and the 
tariff wedge.  The retail and farm prices and the tariff are observed; on the 
assumption of perfect competition, the portion of the price spread in excess of the 
tariff is attributed to marginal marketing cost.  When the tariff is removed 
equilibrium quantity increases from 0Q  to *Q , the point at which the farm-retail 
spread  is equal  to  marginal  marketing  cost  alone.  Figure  2 involves  the  same  
 

For the general functional form case the opposite result is possible.  The removal of the tariff 
would have a greater impact on quantity in the presence of market power than with price-taking 
conduct if and only if 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0>



 ″
⋅+′−



 ″
⋅+′ QSQQSQDQQD fffrrw φθ , 
a condition that could be met with demand sufficiently convex ( ( ) 0>⋅″rD ) and/or supply 
sufficiently concave ( ( ) 0<⋅″fS ).  This is also the condition for the “over-shifting” case in which 
the imposition of a unit tariff would increase the farm-retail price spread by more than the amount 
of the tariff ( ( ) ( )( ) 1>− dTQSQDd fr ).
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Figure 1.  The effects of removal of a unit tariff with competition. 
Price 
                                                    Quantity 
 tariff = T 
marginal marketing cost  
linear demand and supply curves, the same tariff wedge, and the same initial 
values for quantity and farm and retail prices as in Figure 1.  But in Figure 2, this 
same status quo tariff equilibrium is assumed to be the result of the processing 
sector exercising pure monopsony power over producers and pure monopoly 
power over retailers.  This alternative assumption about conduct leads to a 
different inference about marginal marketing cost:  From equation (3) with 
1== fw φθ , marginal marketing cost plus the tariff now determines the size, not 
of the gap between retail demand and farm supply, but of the gap between 
marginal revenue and marginal factor cost.  Removing the tariff wedge shrinks 
this gap but, because marginal revenue is twice as steep as demand and marginal 
factor cost is twice as steep as supply, elimination of the tariff results in a smaller 
quantity adjustment in this case than in the case of competitive equilibrium.  The 
distance between 0Q  and *Q  is smaller in Figure 2 than in Figure 1. 
6 Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization Vol. 8 [2010], Article 11
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With an ad valorem tariff and oligopsony power, a qualitatively different 
result can obtain, however.  The counterpart to equation (2) for the ad valorem
case is 
( ) ( ) ( ) qcqQStqQD pffwwp −⋅⋅+−⋅= 1pi , 
where t  is the tariff rate.  The counterpart to equation (3)’s equilibrium condition 
is7 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) rpfffwrr ccQSQtQStQDQQD +=⋅′⋅⋅+−⋅+−⋅′⋅+ φθ 11 . (4) 
 

 The second-order sufficient condition for the representative processing firm’s profit 
maximization problem, assuming linear demand and supply and constant conduct parameters, is 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0112
2
<⋅+⋅′−⋅+⋅′= ffff
f
www
w
w
p QS
q
QQD
q
Q
dq
d φφθθpi
in the case of a unit tariff.  In the case of an ad valorem tariff, the expression for 22 dqd ppi  is the 
same except for an additional factor of ( )t+1  in the second term.  In either case, the second order 
sufficient condition will be satisfied at any solution to the first-order conditions with 0>wθ  or 
0>fφ  as long as demand slopes down and supply slopes up.
Figure 2.  The effects of removal of a unit tariff with monopsony/monopoly.
Price 
                                               Quantity 
tariff = T 
marginal marketing cost  
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( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )QStQQStQDQQD
QSQQS
dt
dQ
f
f
f
f
r
w
r
w
f
ff
″
⋅⋅+⋅−′⋅+⋅+−″⋅⋅+′⋅+
⋅
′
⋅+
=
φφθθ
φ
1111
Now even in the case of linear supply and demand, there is the potential that the 
response to the removal of the tariff could be greater under market power than 
under competition if the processing sector exercises oligopsony power in the farm 
market.8  For example, in the special case of symmetric market power 
( 0>= fw φθ ), 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )QStQD
QSQQS
dt
dQ
f
f
r
f
f
ff
fw ′
⋅+⋅+−′⋅+
⋅
′
⋅+
=
>= 1110 φφ
φ
φθ
, 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )QStQD
QS
dt
dQ
fr
f
fw ′
⋅+−′
=
== 10φθ
, 
and  
00 ==>=
<
fwfw dt
dQ
dt
dQ
φθφθ
 if and only if 1<fε , 
where ( ) ( ) 0>




⋅
′
≡ QQSQS fffε  is the elasticity of farm supply.9 
 
	
For the case of oligopoly power only ( 0,0 => fw φθ ), we have the same qualitative result as 
for the unit tariff case: 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 011
1
0,0
0
<=
′
⋅+−′⋅+
<
′
⋅+−′
=
=>
==
fw
fw
dt
dQ
QStQD
QS
QStQD
QS
dt
dQ
fr
w
f
fr
f
φθ
φθ
θ
There is a greater impact of tariff removal in the competitive case.


The symmetric market power case ( fw φθ = ) is just one illustration.  For asymmetric market 
power at a single stage, the general condition for trade liberalization effects to be greater than in 
the competitive case is 
Differentiating with respect to t  and solving: 
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Figures 3 and 4 illustrate a scenario in which removal of the tariff has a 
greater impact under market power than under competition for the specific case in 
which market power takes the form of pure monopsony conduct in the farm 
market and pure monopoly conduct in the wholesale market ( 1== fw φθ ).10  As 
before, the status quo tariff equilibrium quantity and retail and farm prices are 
denoted ,, 00 rPQ  and fP0 .  From equation (4) and the assumption that the status 
quo represents a competitive equilibrium, we conclude that 0Q  satisfies 
( ) ( ) ( ) rpffr ccQStQSQD ++⋅=− 000 ,    (5) 
an equation that implicitly defines the level of marginal marketing cost that is 
consistent with the assumption of competitive conduct; ccc rp =+ , say.  When 
the tariff is removed, quantity adjusts to reduce the farm-retail price spread to c
alone.  The free trade equilibrium quantity, denoted 
*
Q  and determined by 
( ) ( ) cQSQD fr =− **
is illustrated in Figure 3. 
   
( )
( ) ( ) 0
1
1
111  >






−
⋅+
−⋅





−
w
f
f
r
f
rf
ff QSt
QD θ
ε
φ
η
φ
εε
, 
where ( ) ( ) 0<




⋅
′
≡ QQDQD rrrη is the elasticity of retail demand.  This is a condition that 
could be satisfied with elastic farm supply but would require at least that 0>− wff θεφ .

As noted above, this outcome requires that supply be inelastic.  An upward-sloping straight-line 
supply curve is inelastic throughout the relevant range (non-negative supply quantities and prices 
if and only if its price axis intercept is negative.  A negative price intercept does, unfortunately, 
imply positive supply quantity at zero price, an obvious implausibility.  Our simplifying 
assumption of a linear functional form should be taken only as a local approximation, however.
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Figure 3.  The effects of removal of an ad valorem tariff with inelastic supply and 
competition. 
Price 



marginal marketing cost  
Quantity 
This equation implicitly fixes the level of marginal marketing cost; ccc rp ~=+ , 
say; that is consistent with the alternative market power story.  Removal of the 
tariff will lead to a free trade equilibrium quantity, 
*
Q , determined by 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) cQSQQSQDQQD ffrr ~****** =
′
⋅+−′⋅+ . 
Figure 4 has the same supply and demand curves as Figure 3 and depicts 
exactly the same status quo prices and quantity, but now interprets them as the  
result of a pure monopsony/monopoly equilibrium.  From equation (4), 0Q  is now 
viewed as satisfying 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) .000
000000
rp
ff
ffrr
ccQSQQSt
QSQQSQDQQD
++



 ′
⋅+⋅=



 ′
⋅+−′⋅+
(6) 
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In terms of the geometry of the graphs, the market’s adjustment to the free 
trade equilibrium in the monopsony/monopoly case differs from that in the 
competitive case in two respects.  First, in the monopsony/monopoly case, the 
“gap” that is “closed” when the tariff is removed and quantity increases, is the 
difference between marginal revenue and marginal factor cost (the left-hand-side 
of equation (6)) whereas, in the competitive case, it is the farm-retail price spread 
(the left-hand-side of equation (5)).  Since the marginal factor cost curve is 
steeper than the supply curve and the marginal revenue curve is steeper than the 
demand curve, it takes a smaller quantity adjustment to close a gap of any given 
size in the monopsony/monopoly case than in the competitive case.  The second 
difference is that removal of the tariff in the monopsony/monopoly case 
eliminates not only the tariff itself ( ( )0QSt f⋅ ), but also the additional monopsony 
pricing distortion that is the result of the tariff ( ( )00 QSQt f ′⋅⋅ ).11  Thus, 
compared to the competitive case, in the monopsony/monopoly case the removal 
of the tariff leaves a bigger “gap” to be “closed” as quantity responds.  These two 
factors work in opposite directions, so the quantity effects of trade reform could 
be larger or smaller in the monopsony/monopoly case than in the competitive 
case.  But Figures 3 and 4 are drawn to reflect inelastic supply leading to the 
result that trade liberalization has a greater impact in the case of symmetric 
market power:  The distance between 0Q  and *Q  is greater in Figure 4 than in 
Figure 3. 
 

 An ad valorem tariff makes the tax-adjusted supply curve less elastic so that there is greater 
scope for the exercise of oligopsony power, and a greater pricing distortion, at any given quantity 
and for any given degree of oligopsony power.
Before we proceed to a more general treatment of the effects of trade 
liberalization with an ad valorem tariff, we offer a brief summary.  As Sexton et 
al. (2007) have shown, with linear supply and demand, the impact of the removal 
of a unit tariff is always greatest when the downstream marketing sectors exhibit 
competitive conduct.  The presence of oligopoly or oligopsony in the marketing 
channel dampens the price and quantity effects of trade reform.  Thus, an analysis 
based on the assumption of competitive conduct would overstate the impact of 
trade liberalization if downstream firms actually exercised market power. 
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Figure 4.  The effects of removal of an ad valorem tariff with inelastic supply and 
monopsony/monopoly. 
Price 



marginal marketing cost  
Quantity 


The case of an ad valorem tariff is different in one important respect.  
Removal of an ad valorem tariff renders the supply of the primary commodity 
more elastic in the farm market, thus reducing the scope for the exercise of 
oligopsony power and its attendant output restriction.  While the presence of 
oligopoly power, by itself, still dampens the effects of removal of the tariff, there 
is a possibility, depending on parameter values, that the exercise of some 
oligopsony power could lead to trade reform effects that are greater than those 
under competition.  To predict the effects of trade reform for various 
combinations and degrees of input and output market power, and for various 
parameter values, we need to develop a general model of the vertically-linked 
marketing sectors.  That task is undertaken in the next section. 
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3. The general model. 
The previous section demonstrated that an analysis, based on the assumption of 
competitive conduct, of the effects of the removal of an ad valorem tariff on an 
agricultural commodity can either overstate or understate the true effects if 
downstream marketing firms exercise market power.  How imperfectly 
competitive conduct influences the effects of trade liberalization depends on 
parameters and on the particular pattern of market power exertion in the 
vertically-linked marketing channel.  In this section, we develop a simple model 
that can be used to project the effects of removal of an ad valorem tariff for 
representative parameter values and for various assumptions about market 
conduct. 
We retain the main assumptions of the previous section.  There is a fixed-
proportions relationship among quantities at the farm, wholesale, and retail levels, 
allowing all three to be measured in common units.  Processors and retailers 
operate at constant marginal cost.  Producers in the developing country and retail 
consumers in the developed country are price-takers.  The supply of the raw 
agricultural commodity in the developing country, ( )fff QSP = , and the demand 
for the retail product in the developed country, ( )rrr QDP = , are assumed linear.  
As in Sexton et al. (2007), we consider three scenarios for the exertion of market 
power by processors and/or retailers.  “Single stage oligopoly and oligopsony” 
describes the case in which one stage, either processors or retailers, exercises 
market power in both its input and output markets while the other stage behaves 
competitively.  In “successive oligopsony with retailer oligopoly,” retailers exert 
oligopoly power in their output (retail) market and oligopsony power in their 
input (wholesale) market, while processors are price takers in the wholesale 
market but exert oligopsony power over producers in the farm market.  In 
“successive oligopoly with processor oligopsony,” processors exert oligopsony 
power over producers in the farm market and oligopoly power over retailers in the 
wholesale market.  Retailers are price takers in the wholesale market but exert 
oligopoly power over consumers in the retail market.12  Like Sexton et al. (2007), 
we do not treat the case of bilateral oligopoly in the wholesale market. 
 

Other patterns of market power exertion are special cases of these three.  For example, the case 
in which both retailers and processors exert oligopoly power (only) obtains by setting fφ , the 
index of processor oligopsony power, equal to zero in the “successive oligopoly with processor 
oligopsony” case.
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The previous section works out the case for single stage market power 
exercised by processors, leading to equilibrium condition (4).  The case of single 
stage market power in the hands of retailers (retailers have oligopoly/oligopsony 
power and processors are price takers) works out in a very similar fashion and 
leads to an equilibrium condition essentially equivalent to equation (4) and 
written here as equation (7):13 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) rpwffrrr ccQSQtQStQDQQD +=⋅′⋅⋅+−⋅+−⋅′⋅+ φθ 11 , (7) 
where rθ  is a conduct parameter indexing retailers’ degree of oligopoly power in 
the retail market and wφ  is a conduct parameter indexing retailers’ degree of 
oligopsony power in the wholesale market.  The obvious similarity of equations 
(4) and (7) makes it clear that, for given degrees of buyer and seller market 
power, the equilibrium values of rPQ, , and fP are independent of whether 
market power is exercised by retailers or processors.14 
In the successive oligopsony with retailer oligopoly case, processors 
exercise oligopsony power over producers but are price takers in their output 
 

 Price-taking behavior by processors generates a wholesale market supply function:  
( ) ( ) ( ) pffwww cQStQSP +⋅+≡= 1 .  Incorporating this into the profit function of a representative 
retailing firm and proceeding as in the case of processor market power leads to equation (7).

The one difference between the equilibria in these two cases is price in the wholesale market.  
While equilibrium retail and farm prices, rP  and fP , are the same in both cases, in the processor 
market power case, wholesale price, wP , is rr cP − .  In the retailer market power case:  
( ) pfw cPtP +⋅+= 1 .
(wholesale) market, while retailers have market power in both their input 
(wholesale) and output (retail) markets.  The first step is to derive processors’ 
supply function.  Profit for the representative firm in the processing sector is 
( ) ( ) qcqQStqP pffwp −⋅⋅+−⋅= 1pi . 
Differentiating: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ,11
11
pff
f
ff
f
w
p
f
f
f
f
f
wp
cQStQQStP
c
dq
dQQSqtQStP
dq
d
−⋅
′
⋅+⋅−⋅+−=
−
′
⋅⋅+−⋅+−=
φ
pi
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where fφ , as before, is ( ) ( )ff QqdqdQ ⋅ .  Setting dqd ppi  equal to zero and 
substituting wf QQ =  yields the wholesale supply function: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) pfwfwwfwww cQStQQStQSP +⋅′⋅+⋅+⋅+≡= φ11 (8) 
Profit for the representative firm in the retailing sector is 
( ) ( ) .qcqQSqQD rwwrrr −⋅−⋅=pi
The first-order condition for profit maximization can be written as 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0=−⋅′⋅−−⋅′⋅+ rwwwwwwrrrrrr cQSQQSQDQQD φθ , (9) 
where rθ  again indexes retailers’ oligopoly market power and ( ) ( )www QqdqdQ ⋅=φ  indexes retailers’ oligopsony market power.  From (8), 
using the assumption that farm supply is linear: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )wffww QStQS ′⋅+⋅+=′ φ11 . 
Substituting for ( )w Q wS ′  and ( )wSw Q  in (9) and invoking QQQ rw == , we have 
the equilibrium condition for the successive oligopsony with retailer oligopoly 
case: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) rpwfff
f
r
rr
ccQSQt
QStQDQQD
+=++⋅′⋅⋅+−
⋅+−⋅′⋅+
φφφ
θ
.11
1
(10) 
In the successive oligopoly with processor oligopsony case, retailers 
exercise oligopoly power over consumers but are price takers in their input 
(wholesale) market, while processors have market power in both their input 
(farm) and output (wholesale) markets.  In this case, the analysis begins with a 
derivation of retailers’ demand for the wholesale product: 
( ) ( ) ( ) rrwrwwrwww cQDQQDQDP −⋅′⋅+≡= θ , 
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and proceeds to a first order condition characterizing profit maximization for the 
representative firm in the processing sector.  Omitting details, the result is 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) rpfff
wrr
rr
ccQSQtQSt
QDQQD
+=⋅′⋅⋅+−⋅+−
⋅++⋅′⋅+
φ
θθθ
11
1 (11) 
The equilibrium conditions for the cases of single-stage market power at 
the processor level (4), and at the retailer level (7), and for successive oligopsony 
(10), and successive oligopoly (11) can all be nested in a single equation: 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) .11
11
rpwff
f
f
wrr
rr
ccQSQt
QStQDQQD
+=⋅++⋅′⋅⋅+−
⋅+−⋅++⋅′⋅+
φφφ
θθθ
(12) 
The values of the four conduct parameters; wwr φθθ ,, , and fφ ; are all contained 
in the [ ]1,0  interval, although at least one of wθ  and wφ  must be zero.  With 
0== wr φθ , (12) reduces to (4), the single-stage/processor case.  0== fw φθ  in 
(12) yields (7), the single-stage/retailer case.  Setting wθ  to zero in (12) gives 
(10), the equilibrium condition for successive oligopsony with retailer oligopoly.  
Finally, with 0=wφ , (12) becomes (11), the condition for successive oligopoly 
with processor oligopsony. 
4. Some numerical illustrations. 
Again, our focus is a marketing channel that uses imports of an agricultural 
commodity, subject to an ad valorem tariff, to produce a retail food product for 
sale to domestic consumers.  From the perspective of the analyst, certain stylized 
characteristics of the vertically-linked farm, wholesale, and retail markets 
comprising the channel can be directly observed or fairly readily estimated.  
These features include the farm supply and retail demand elasticities, and the 
farmers’ share of retail price that characterize the status quo tariff equilibria of 
actual markets.  What is less directly estimable, and generally unknown to the 
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analyst, is the nature of the solution concept underlying the observed equilibria.15  
Competitive conduct is one possibility, but the alternative market power scenarios 
presented in the previous section are also possibilities.16  The goal of the analysis 
of the effects of trade liberalization is to predict how the free-trade equilibrium 
will compare to the status quo tariff equilibrium for various market power 
scenarios.  To use the model to achieve this goal, we must first calibrate it to 
insure that the model’s tariff equilibrium reflects features that are characteristic of 
real world markets. 
In their analysis of the effects of removal of a unit tariff, Sexton et al.
(2007) calibrated their model to reflect representative values for supply and 
demand elasticities, and for the farmers’ and the tariff’s share of the retail price.  
But their calibration method imposed these representative values at a hypothetical 
free-trade competitive equilibrium, rather than at the actual status quo
equilibrium, which involves a tariff and is assumed to incorporate market power.  
This leads, in some cases, to sizeable differences between these representative 
values and their model’s actual status quo tariff equilibrium values of the 
parameters.17  Thus, their comparisons of the impact of trade reform for different 
assumptions about the degree of status quo market power confound the effects of 
changing conduct with the effects of changing demand and supply elasticities and 
the effects of changing farm/retail price ratios.  To avoid this problem in our 
analysis of the effects of removal of an ad valorem tariff, we calibrate our model 
to exhibit representative elasticities and the farmers’ share of retail price at the 
status quo tariff equilibrium instead of at the free-trade competitive equilibrium. 
 

 Empirical methods are available for the measurement of market power, given sufficient data.  
Bhuyan and Lopez (1997) apply the “New Empirical Industrial Organization” approach to a 
systematic assessment of oligopoly power in four-digit SIC food and tobacco industries.

 Different market power scenarios imply different decompositions of the observed spread 
between the retail price and the tariff inclusive farm price into oligopoly/oligopsony pricing 
distortions, on the one hand, and marginal marketing cost, on the other.  So the problem of 
inferring market conduct is really just the mirror image of the problem of measuring marginal cost.

For example, Sexton et al. (2007) imposed supply and demand elasticities of 0.6 and a farmers’ 
share of the retail price of 0.2 at the free-trade competitive equilibrium.  But, in their “successive 
oligopsony” case, with uniform values of 0.2 for the conduct parameters, the actual demand and 
supply elasticities at the tariff equilibrium are 1.20 and 0.45, respectively, and the actual farmers’ 
share is 0.074.  For successive oligopsony with conduct parameter values of 0.4, the 
corresponding values are 1.65, 0.34, and 0.041, respectively.  The relative magnitude of the tariff 
that is being eliminated also varies across their market power scenarios.  Their simulations use a 
unit tariff fixed at the value of 0.2 which, in terms of their normalization, represents 20% of the 
retail price at the hypothetical free-trade competitive equilibrium.  But it represents, for example, 
13.7% and 12.0% of the retail prices in the status quo tariff equilibria for successive oligopsony 
with conduct parameters of 0.2 and 0.4, respectively.
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To begin, we normalize units so that the initial tariff equilibrium quantity 
corresponds to 1000 =Q , and the initial tariff equilibrium producers’ price (net of 
the tariff) corresponds to 10 =fP .  Sexton et al. (2007) cite representative 
examples of imported agricultural commodities for which the farmers’ share of 
retail price is in the range of 5% to 10%.  We calibrate the model to a status quo 
tariff equilibrium retail price of 150 =rP , implying a farmers’ share of 6.67%.  
We assume retail demand and farm supply elasticities of 0.6 ( 6.0==− fr εη ), as 
do Sexton et al. (2007).18  Finally, we consider the effects of elimination of an ad 
valorem tariff that amounts to 20% of the farm price, implying 2.0=t .19 
With these normalizations, the (constant) inverse demand and supply 
slopes are given by 25.0// 00 −==
′ rr
r QPD η  and 0167.0// 00 ==′ fff QPS ε .  
The inverse demand and supply functions themselves are given by: 
( ) ( ) QPDQQQDP rrrr ⋅−=+′⋅−== 25.04000   and  (13) 
( ) ( ) QPSQQQSP ffff ⋅+−=+′⋅−== 0167.0667.000 .  (14) 
A given set of values for the conduct parameters; wwr φθθ ,, , and fφ ; implies a 
given pattern and degree of market power exertion.20  For any such set of values, 
evaluating (12) at the status quo tariff equilibrium 
 
	
Sexton and Zhang (2001) note that, in food marketing channels, both retail demand and farm 
supply are often relatively inelastic.  For example, Bhuyan and Lopez (1997) and Abbott et al.
(2005) found evidence of elasticities of demand for agricultural products such as roasted coffee 
and chocolate very close to 0.5.  Estimates of the elasticity of supply of cocoa by Abbott et al.
(2005) lie in the range of 0.3 to 0.5, comparing quite closely with the point estimate of 0.45 by 
Gilbert and Varangis (2003).


This choice is made, in part, for consistency with Sexton et al., but is supported by empirical 
evidence as well.  For example, Aksoy and Beghin (2005) report average ad valorem tariff and 
tariff-equivalent rates imposed by the U.S. on agricultural imports of 10.6% and 35.2%, 
respectively.  The corresponding figures for the EU are 21.6% and 58%, which comport well with 
the latest statistics of the WTO.  These show that current average ad valorem Most-Favored-
Nation tariff rates applied on agricultural imports by the U.S., the EU, and Japan are, respectively 
5.3%, 16%, and 23.6%.  (WTO, World Tariff Profiles 2009 – Summary)  Thus, the assumption of 
a 20% ad valorem tariff rate could be described as moderate.

For example, 0=wθ  and 1.0=== fwr φφθ  corresponds to what we have called “successive 
oligopsony with retailer oligopoly” with a modest degree of market power, reflected in conduct 
parameter values of 0.1, at each stage.  We carry out simulations for market power parameters 
generally in the range of 0.0 to 0.4.  Conduct parameters of this magnitude appear to be in line 
with the empirical evidence for food processing industries.  Bhuyan and Lopez (1997), Wilson 
18 Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization Vol. 8 [2010], Article 11
Brought to you by | Iowa State University
Authenticated
Download Date | 8/23/18 5:22 PM
( ( ) ( ) ,1,15,100,2.0 000 ==== QSQDQt fr ( ) ,25.00 −=′ QDr  and 
( ) 0167.0′ 0 =QS f ) enables inference of the value for marginal processing cost 
that is consistent with that particular market power scenario; rp cc 00 + , say.  Then 
using (12) again, with rprp cccc 00 +=+ , the value of t  reset to zero, and (13) and 
(14) substituted for ( )QDr  and ( )QS f  gives an equation that can be solved for 
the free-trade equilibrium quantity, 
*
Q : 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ′⋅+⋅+−′⋅+⋅+
+−



 ′
−
′
⋅++
=
f
wf
r
wr
fr
fr
rp
SD
PPSDQcc
Q
φφθθ 1111
00000
*
. 
The free-trade equilibrium values of retail and farm price, rP
*
 and fP
*
, are found 
by substituting 
*
Q  into (13) and (14).  The welfare effects of trade liberalization; 
the changes in farm producer surplus ( PS∆ ), retail consumer surplus ( CS∆ ), and 
profit in the marketing channel ( ∆Π ); are readily obtained as: 
( ) ( ) ( ) 2/0*0*0*0 ffff PPQQPPQPS −⋅−+−⋅=∆ , 
( ) ( ) ( ) 2/
*00**00
rrrr PPQQPPQCS −⋅−+−⋅=∆ ,  and 
( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) 00000*00** 1 QccPtPQccPP rpfrrpfr ⋅+−⋅+−−⋅+−−=∆Π . 
First, let us briefly summarize the impact of trade liberalization on 
quantity and price in the case of linear supply and demand and a unit tariff.  
Sexton et al. (2007) show that the removal of the tariff leads to the greatest 
impacts when conduct is competitive:  The introduction of market power always 
reduces the effect of trade liberalization.  For a given pattern of market power 
exertion (for example, successive oligopoly with processor oligopsony), the 
effects on price and quantity always decrease as the degree of market power 
increases.  Moreover, holding fixed the values of the market power indices, 
adding an additional “layer” of market power always leads to a smaller impact of 
trade reform.  For example, the price and quantity effects are smaller in the case 
   
(1997), and Schroeter (1988) estimate market power in U.S. food and tobacco industries, the UK 
bread manufacturing industry, and the U.S. beef packing industry, respectively.  For the most part, 
their estimates of conduct parameters lie in the range of 0.18 to 0.30.  Bhuyan and Lopez (1997) 
did find evidence of conduct parameters approaching 0.5 in the four-digit U.S. food and beverage 
industries of cereal preparation, flour and grain milling, and soybean oil mills.
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of successive oligopsony with retailer oligopoly than they are for the case of 
single stage market power (oligopoly and oligopsony) at the retail level.21 
With linear supply and demand but an ad valorem tariff, however, it is 
possible that the effects of trade liberalization could be greater than those that 
would obtain with competitive conduct if oligopsony power is exercised in at least 
one stage.  This is because the removal of an ad valorem tariff makes supply more 
elastic and thus reduces the oligopsony pricing distortion for any given degree of 
market power.  Figure 5 plots the farm price change due to the removal of the ad 
valorem tariff as a function of market power, for each of seven patterns of market 
power exertion.  For purposes of illustration, the effects on the farm price are 
calculated for the case in which there is a common value for the market power 
indices that are non-zero in a particular market power scenario.22  The bottom 
three lines in Figure 5’s graph correspond to (respectively, from lowest to highest) 
the market power scenarios of processor and retailer oligopoly only, single stage 
(processor or retailer) oligopoly only, and successive oligopoly with processor 
oligopsony.  For these three scenarios, the impact of tariff removal is smaller with 
market power than under competition, and always decreases as market power 
increases; a result qualitatively similar to that found by Sexton et al. (2007) for 
the unit tariff case.  For the case of both oligopoly and oligopsony at a single 
stage (either processor or retailer), corresponding to the fourth line from the 
bottom in Figure 5, the impact of the removal of an ad valorem tariff increases as 
the degree of market power increases.  In other words, for this case, an analysis of 
the impact of removal of an ad valorem tariff, based on the erroneous assumption 
of price taking conduct, would understate the true impact assuming that firms 
actually exercise market power.  In comparisons of the effects of trade reform for 
pairs of market power scenarios, adding oligopsony power at an additional stage, 
or removing oligopoly power from a stage, increases the impact of tariff removal 
for any given degree of market power.  The greatest impact occurs in the case in 
which processors exercise oligopsony power in the farm market and retailers 
exercise oligopsony power in the wholesale market, while both behave 
competitively in their output markets.  In this scenario, and with market power 
indices of 0.3 ( 3.0;0 ==== wfwr φφθθ ), the effect of tariff removal on the  
 

These relationships are illustrated, for the case of the farm price, in Figure 6 in Sexton et al.
(2007).

For example, in the case of successive oligopsony with retailer oligopoly, the common value of 
wr φθ , , and fφ  is plotted on the horizontal axis of Figure 5.  For the “successive oligopoly with 
processor oligopsony” case and the “processor and retailer oligopoly only” case, the graphs 
terminate at market power index values of 0.23 and 0.24 respectively.  In these cases, higher index 
values imply pricing distortions that would consume more than the entire spread between the retail 
and tariff-inclusive farm prices and are thus inconsistent with positive marginal cost.
farm price is an increase of 2.58%, more than twice the increase that would result 
under competitive conduct. 
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Figure 5.  Changes in farm price as a result of trade liberalization.  (Tariff equilibrium farm price normalized to one:  
10 =
fP .) 
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How market power affects the distribution of benefits from trade 
liberalization also depends crucially on the nature of the tariff: unit or ad valorem.  
Figure 6 plots, as a function of the degree of market power, the changes in retail 
consumer surplus, farm producer surplus, and marketers’ profit that result from 
removal of an ad valorem tariff in the case of oligopoly (only) at a single stage.  
This graph is quite reminiscent of similar graphs in Sexton et al. (2007) showing 
the distribution of trade reform benefits for the case of a unit tariff.23  With 
competitive conduct, consumers and producers capture all of the benefits of trade 
reform, as marketers’ profit is zero both with and without the tariff.  As the 
oligopoly power index increases, the changes in both retail consumer surplus and 
farm producer surplus decline as marketers capture an increasing share of the 
welfare gains.  Marketers’ profit is simply the oligopoly pricing distortion times 
the number of units marketed.  In the linear supply and demand case, with an ad 
valorem tariff as with a unit tariff, both of these factors increase when the tariff is 
removed. 
With an ad valorem tariff and oligopsony power exercised in the 
marketing channel, the relationship between market power and the distribution of 
the welfare gains can be quite different, however.  Figure 7 plots, as a function of 
the market power index, the changes in welfare measures for the case of 
oligopsony at a single stage.  The changes in retail consumer surplus and farm 
producer surplus both increase as market power increases.  For the parameter 
values inherent in our calibration of the model, trade reform leads to bigger 
quantity and price impacts with market power than with competition, and both 
consumers and producers benefit from this.  The change in marketers profit 
becomes increasingly negative as the market power index increases.24  The 
elimination of an ad valorem tariff reduces marketers’ markup of price over unit 
costs because it makes input supply more elastic and thus reduces the oligopsony 
price distortion.  This reduction in profit margin is partially offset by the fact that 
trade reform leads to greater unit sales.  But for our representative parameter 
values, the net effect of trade reform is a decrease in marketers’ profit for this case 
of oligopsony at a single stage. 
 

Figures 8 and 9 in Sexton et al. (2007) are the counterpart graphs.

 With market power, marketers’ profit is positive both before and after trade reform.  Trade 
reform reduces marketers’ profit, however, and by amounts that increase as the degree of market 
power increases.
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Figure 6.  Changes in welfare measures as a result of trade liberalization:  One-stage oligopoly case.  (Tariff 
equilibrium farm revenue normalized to 100.) 
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Figure 7.  Changes in welfare measures as a result of trade liberalization:  One-stage oligopsony case.  (Tariff 
equilibrium farm revenue normalized to 100.) 
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Figure 8.  Changes in welfare measures as a result of trade liberalization:  One-stage oligopoly and oligopsony case.  
(Tariff equilibrium farm revenue normalized to 100.) 
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symmetric case in which there is a common value for the input and output market 
power indices.  Retail consumers, farm producers, and marketers all benefit from 
removal of the tariff, and the benefits increase as market power increases, 
although only slightly in the case of producers in the developing country.  Finally, 
Figure 9 shows the distribution of benefits for the case of successive oligopsony 
with retailer oligopoly.25  Consumers and producers benefit from trade reform to 
an increasing extent as market power increases.  The change in marketers’ profit 
is generally negative, first decreasing, then increasing as the degree of market 
power increases.  In this scenario, the elimination of the tariff affects marketers’ 
profit through its impact on three factors: output, and the oligopoly and 
oligopsony pricing distortions.  The oligopsony distortion, represented by 
( ) ( ) ( )( )wfff QSQt φφφ .11 ++⋅′⋅⋅+ in equation (10), gets smaller as t goes to 
zero.  Output and the oligopoly pricing distortion, ( ) rDQ r Q θ⋅′⋅ , increase.  For 
low levels of the market power index, the effect of a smaller oligopsony distortion 
dominates and marketers’ profit falls with trade liberalization.  As the market 
power index increases to around 0.4, the effects of the three factors approximately 
offset, leaving no change in marketers’ profit as the tariff is eliminated. 
5. Summary. 
For many developing countries, the majority of their export earnings are 
attributable to agricultural commodities sold to developed countries and subject to 
tariffs.  The removal of these tariffs will increase the volume of trade and the 
prices received by developing country producers, but because these commodities 
are used as inputs in the food processing and retailing industries of the developed 
countries, firm conduct within those industries will have an influence on the 
magnitudes of the effects of trade liberalization.  In this paper we extend the 
analysis of trade liberalization with downstream market power to the case of an 
ad valorem tariff and we find significant differences in results compared to those 
for the constant per unit tariff case.  These differences stem from the fact that an 
ad valorem tariff, unlike a unit tariff, makes supply less elastic and therefore 
increases the scope for the exercise of oligopsony power by marketing firms.
 

Results again are for the symmetric case in which wf φφ , , and rθ  share a common value that is 
plotted on the horizontal axis of Figure 9.
     
Still other patterns for the distribution of trade liberalization benefits are 
possible.  Figure 8 plots, as a function of the market power index, the benefits of 
removing an ad valorem tariff with both oligopoly and oligopsony power 
exercised at a single stage.  Here, as in Figure 5, we show results for the 
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Figure 9.  Changes in welfare measures as a result of trade liberalization:  Successive oligopsony with retailer oligopoly 
case.  (Tariff equilibrium farm revenue normalized to 100.) 
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distribution of the benefits of trade liberalization also differ between the unit and 
ad valorem tariff cases.  With a unit tariff, increasing market power always 
enables processors and retailers to appropriate a larger share of the gains from 
trade reform at the expense of farm producers and retail consumers.  With an ad 
valorem tariff, a variety of different patterns are possible for the distribution of 
benefits.  In particular, there are scenarios in which producers and consumers gain 
more from trade reform than they would if firms in the marketing channel 
behaved competitively. 
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